On the Mexican crisis by Pillai, P. Mohanan
ONTHE MEXICAN CRISIS 
P. Mohanafi P i l fa i  
Working l'apcr N o  262 
Centre for Development- Studies 
T h i r r ~ v a n d q u  ram 
Decelnber 1995 
ON THE MEXICAN CRISIS 
Abstract 
This paper examines the major Cactors arld forces that led t o  t h e  present 
mimmfc situation in Mexico. It begins with a discussion or the peculiar 
m m n o m i c  circumstances that necessitated the  siabiliza Lion and structural 
a$jusQnent policies in the 80s. This is followed by an analysis of the Mexican 
wperirnent with stabilization and structural ad jus t  men t and how the experiment 
i k l f  wried the seeds or further crisis that h a s  culminated in thc latest 
debacle. The concluding part or the  paper draws some lessons Tor other 
heloping countries. 
ON 'ITIF MRXJCAN Cllf.S'iS 
P. Mohnoan Pillai 
"The U.S.m,zrines paunm:l or1 thr* port of Vcracruz in 19111. rollowing 
the rmlsteps of' Spanish and F~.ench invaders who had landed Shercl 
at ddifferent times in the years beforc. Now, in a strange and 
poignant twist of history, t h e  Mexican government ~auglil: in a 
sudden and severe financial crisis, says il is willi~lg to sell - or to 
put it more politely privatize - not only Lhe oft-besieged Varacruz 
but three other harbours. t he  capitals airports, an unrlisclosed 
number of toll roads, and the 1600 m i l e  nalional ralway system". 
1 So says Lee Smith on the rp~c111 Mcxjcarl r:risis . This  is IHII a rhetoric. 
But there is no novelty in this assertinn. 1,ee Smith has forgotten the facl that  
the process of selling out Mexican assets had began a s  far back as 1982 when 
the then financial crisis had w r e c k e d  the Mexica r t  txrmorn y. 'I'he w or Id renlcn be1.s 
that ft was Mexico that had triggcsstl oe'T It lr-  'Third WortrI dcllt c:risis. 'I'll(: 
W a p y  applied then by the  IMF and the Wurld Bank gave t h e  economy a 
krpmary relIeP but it was at t h e  m s t  nr an unln ld  human misery. The  virus 
that afflicted the Mexican economy then remained subdued for a while,  b u t  
reuppeared with greater force in 1994. This time Lhe orthodox stabilization arid 
adjustment medicine failed to effect a recovery. Iroi~imlly enough, thc rescue 
W a g e  has proved to be too mstly, consisting of mortgaging national assets to 
py back the external debt! 
hpmk d Mewewmn DeveIopme~~t SLra tcgy 
In the beginning of the  80's thc  nature and signiricance of  macro-ccnnomic 
&s in Mexico called in to question the validity of import-su bstilu lion model and 
tbe ef'fectiveness of state intervention in thc market. Mexjco possessed huge 
m W e s  of petroleum; yet in 1982, a situation iircjse in  which thi: country fbund 
it did not have adequate resources of foreign exchange for servicing foreign 
debt and pay' For its imports. I.nnking a t  the [~et'Tormancu ol' tht: trxmurny rjrior 
k the crisis, one finds that Lhe Mc?xican mlnorny had performed remarkably. 
bring the period from 1950 - 1973 ( the  date of the  first oil dlock ), the gross 
d ~ i l c  product expanded at: an average anrninl rn le  nf nearly 6,ti p-rc%r I r n  t whi lc  
Inflation remained below 4 ,S percen 1. Flexico's development sirlcc Lllc Sccorl r l  
World War was marked by a strategy or impor t-su bst i  tution based or1 protcctinn. 
The high growth achieved du t-irlg Ule 1950s and the 1965s was of Len refel-red Lo 
4 
.as the 'Mexican Miracle'. During the im port-su bslitutiion strategy still c excrciscrf 
a hjghur dcgruc i)r direcL ~ c u ~ ~ ~ u m j c  cull tr'ol w 1 t ! ~  slate ow nr:d I ' i  t-111s rflrl Lt-ollirlg 
important sectors of the economy. IIowever, t h e  role of t h e  statc in planning and 
direction of the economy was limited. The government policy favoured irldustry 
BVW agriculture and within agriculture large commercial farms producing mainly 
a m .  Consequently, Mexico had become a net importer of food grainsz The 
distribution of GDP by sectors soowed that the share of industrial output in GDP 
whlth stood at  21.5 per cent in 1950 increased to 30 per cent in 1985 and lhat  
theshare of agriculture declined from 19 p'er cent to 9 during the same period 
(See Table I).  
It may be pointed out in this context that the Mexican industrialization 
dm not have quite the same degree of diversffication and sophisticalion as that 
d other developing countries say Brazil or India. 
Table I 
?@rcmtage Distribution of GDP by Sector of Origin 1950-85: Mexico. 
-------- ----------- - ---- --- --------------- ------------------------- 
Agriculture Mining Manuf ac t -  Other 
b other pri- including uring Services 
Years mary acti- o i l  extra- constrn & govt . etc Total. 
v i  ties ction electricity 
-4------ - ------- -- 
1950 19 -1 5.1 21.5 5 4 . 4  100 
1960 17.1 3.1 25.4 5 4 . 4  100 
1970 12.2 2.5 30.1 55.2 100 
1980 8.2  3 . 2  29.5 59.1 100 
1985 9.1 4 . 7  28.7 57.5 100 
--I------ ------I--_--- ----- -  -  - -------- - -- ..+-- - - - - - - ---- - - - --- - 
'Source: Nora Lusting and Jaine Ross o p .  ci l. 
Unlike in the case of the above countries, where hcavy inveslmcnk wcre 
mmmitted ta capital goods, t he  emphasis of Mexian industrialization had been m 
petrochemicals, metallurgy and simple machinery. OS late, them has  been an 
emphasis also on consumer durablcs and automobiles, 
Studies on Mexican industrialization process had underlined, the  emerging 
nonopolistic/ollgopolistic character of the indrrslrial structure. By 1972, the 
3 foreign transnational controlled 52 per cent of Mexico's manufacturing rirms . 
Though the import-substitu lion Icd growth creaCcd linkagcs i n  the industrial 
4 sector, the contribution or total factor prnductiviLy to output cxpcrlscs was small . 
The main reason attri butcd to this situalion was t-hat the large ancl rncdiurn r i r m s  
which benefitted from access to credit as well as foreign technology, Lended to 
maah capital intensive , and inefficient and market structure highly 
amcentrated5. We also have to bear in mind that employment cxpansiorl rluring 
the period oP rapid expansion was limilcd. Conserlueritly. a highly unbalanced 
duaktic structure ' rernain~d within the different sectors of t he  ccanomy. 
Ncedless lo say, the curnulalive uu Lcome of all ltlcse had b w n  led La a sitrlatirln 
sf highly unequal distributio~~ of intune. which, to a very considerable exlent, 
UmIkd the possi hllities or impor t-su bstitution'. 
By the 1970s, thc limihlions of the Meximn ~nudel w e r e  evident. In the 
face d mounting unemployrneni, i t  was .already clear lhat private investment was 
pwing slawIy and that '"~ccausc protected rnooapoly had alrcady achieved a 
strong marked presence it had little Incentlvc to kecp Growing hy nieans or 
1 higher employment and increased productivity. In such a context the ruling 
class had only two optioins - either to opt for an export promotion strategy or 
to expand public spending to ofTer employment for t h e  growing \~orkTorcc. 
In the face of growing soE&-1 urrrest, Mexico opted for the laitcr stralegy 
but not accompanicrl by t t ~ c  prospcct of' rising incomc. CarlscquerlLly, thr fiscal 
deficit increased which was financcd inrrr-easi ngly by forcig n borrowirl g and 
public debt. Between I973 and 78, t h e  public sector dericit rose f r o m  2-5 per 
aent to 8 per cent  of GDP furlllsr to 10.2 by 1979-83 firlariccd by internal and 
wkrnal borrowings (See Table II). 
Table XI 
Yrincipal Macroeconomic Indicators : Mcxico 
GDP (annual growth rate)* 6 .7  6.1 7.1 
Inflation Rate (Per cent)  3 . 1  16.7 23.8 
Public Deficit (percent of GDP) 2.5 8.0 10.2 
Note: * in percentage 
Source: Same as t a b l e  1. 
The aggregate demand rosc as a result of increased public and private 
spending, Private investment was stimulated by an increase in the supply of 
credit by the banking syslcm. Thc cxpnnsionary f iscd policy f ueiled inflationary 
pressures. As is clew from Table JI, inflation was the  price Mexico had Lu pay 
for achieving relatively high growth rates! 
Despite the high dcgree ol' inflatinn, tl~c Mexican rcginw had a very 
positive view of the F u t ~ l r ~  of Lhc rlcnnorny. This was due to Ihe discovery of 
l ~ g c  hydro-carbon rcscrvt:l;, wh i c l ~ ,  l.I>t: itul.horitjr:s t110tigI~l \rpoulrl su!) j j :  ,I [ Ellc 
renewed expansion of sper!;l ing. As Donald klymorj has rightly ol~sct-vctl i I I l l ~  is 
conlcxl, "Spending appcar.c(l lo Ilavt: 110 trouI)lr:s, ofricii~ls wcr-c? prcpnrrrl irl 111112 
classic phrase, Lo l c l  Ihc: ~ r w d  tincs r.oll"! 
The pressures on Ihc pr i ce  front wcrc very ir~ltcnse: the government's 
response to them was ovcrvahre the  "peso" which meant Lhat inrported goods 
bemme less expensive relative to Mexican goods and Mexican exports became 
aw1lPc1- ill III~! c!xl~!t'llul rarltcl .  Ilowcvt!t-, Lhr: butmalcn pul ou 1110 uxlc*r~~al st:clos. 
was loa I~cavy. Conscqucnlly, thc currenl dcficil  sweilcd {to 4 per cwtlt of GDP).  
As the gap between the domes tic arid international prices started widening, the 
real value of the peso relative to that of dollar began to Call which affected the 
import of intermediates - consequence of which was fur ther  fall in the  non-oil 
ercports. The swelling deficit in the current account was to s o m e  extent offset 
by external borrowing. 
Interest payment on t h e  n e w  borrowing proved a serious drain on current 
accou~ll baiance, A s  Ihe sllori- r u n  rncasu rcs suc11 (eg.incc-n Llvc lo cxpor L 
promotion etc.) failed to improve Che situation. Capital flight accelerated sharply 
during Ule 1980s. The weakening OF the world petroleum market gave an added 
blow to  the already precarious foreign exchange situation. B y  then public debt 
grew by $20 billion. The operational deficit rose from 16 per cent of GDP by 
1932 and forcign d c t ~ t  around 54.4 pcr ccrtt nf GDP jn t h c  samc ycar. 'The 
situation worsened when inlernatienal lending was suddenly in terrupted.  Crisis 
Pohwed on a grand smle. GDP registered a decline of 0.5 per cent in 1982 and 
the annual rate of inflation 98.8 per cenl. 
MUweoonomic Adjustmen t 
By April 1982, the government announced an economic adjustment 
programme to restore price and exchange rate stability and balance of payments 
equilibrium. Mexican government officials made several trips to Washington in 
mch of an emergency bail out package and started negotiations with IMF. In 
keeping agr-ment with IMF, the two .,major measures contemplated to check 
InPIatlon and to restore exchange rate stability were immediate reduction in 
I$wernment deflclt and rnalntenanoe of an undervalued exchange rate to avoid 
financial speculation. Towards this purpose. the government reduced public 
spending substantially and increased public sector prices and tarifP. 
As revealed by the data presented in tables 111, VI and VII, 1982-88 was 
me of the worst in Mexican history, a period of stagnation followed by one of 
declining living standards. The cut in government expenditure drastically 
affected capltai formation, real wages and social expenditures much more sharply. 
To illustrate, the fixed capital formation declined from 23.8 per cent of the GDP 
in 1989 to 18.9 in 1987-88, whiIe inrlation rose from 29.8 per cent in 1980 lo 159.2 
per cent in 1987-88, Table 111. Consequently, real wages declined from 100 in 
1982 to 38.5 and minimum wages by 49 per cent in 1988 (See Table VlI) .  
AS the exchange rate depreciated fu rther, current account situation 
improved dramatidly . As the policy or stabilization gained further rnomcn turn, 
inrlatiori illstl s1)iral l t ~ ~  urlti 1 \ . [ I (>  imp  lerncnialior~ ol' Lhe wirlc ranging "ecorlurnic 
solidarity pacL" ol' 1987 began. 
Ttw economic solidarity llact w a s  launched in March 1987. i t  was an 
1 .A sLfnc~rlg t r l )  wilt.!J ;I(] jus1111!:1l I. 01' pt-ic:r:s oi' pi1  lllic goods i l r l r l  SCI-viws r l ~ l l l  
more auslerity in governmenL spending. 
2 .An adjustment oC the controlled exchange rate intended to close the  gap 
wilh rrr:e ratc provokerl by  devaluatiorl and virtual rreezirlg of L t k ~  
uonirolled rate unLil Junc 1988, 'I'he exchangc rate would servc as an 
anchor Sot- inflation. 
3 .A wage increase at thc  ir~itation of the pact and commitment la index 
wages to irlflalion from March 1988 onwards. 
4 .A speeding up of trade reforms'aiming at greater exposure aS domestic 
prices to competition from abroad to combat inrlation. 
'I'tic rcsults o P  Lhc O i l ~ t  wcrc* ([\lit(. pc~silivc. I)urir\g 1908 rnnrll hly inl'lillioil 
dropped I'rom 15 per ct-:n t in ,Janu;kry to approxirnaLt:ly oric per- ccri t ill Ilc.cumbcr. 
Real GDP grew at 1.4 per cent. The economic deficit of the public sector declined 
f rom 13.4 per cent of G D P  in 1987 to 10.7 pcr cent in 1988. So was the 
operittior~al dcf'icjl w h j c l l  d(:clinc:d I'ron~ 5.11 tu 0.7 per corlt ol' (;1)1'. (st-o 'I'alllc 
IV). During this period t h e  nornirlal cxchange rale remained slable. 
Analysts of Mexican scene have underlilned t h e  basic reasons for t h e  
success of the pact. It was poinLed out that h e  drop in inflation rate was due 
10 to the use of income policy complemented by fiscal and monetary discipline . 
Needless to say, the authoritarian political structure of Mexico facilitated the 
Implementation of income policy in ihe  sense that the state conceded t h e  wage 
revision only selectively ie. revisions were granted only when the frictions had 
reached certain intolerable l i m i t s .  The exchange rate was  kept at a stable level 
by releasing the rcserves of Central Bank. This  s t ep  has resulted in the 
appreciation of the  peso and checked capital Plight to some extent. Operational 
deficit came down on account of drastic reduction in government expenditure and 
by raising the prices of public sector goods and services. 
In view of i ts success of' t h e  pact, it w a s  extended to 1989 and 1990. 
Some disturbing reaturcs or Ltlc A c t  11ad already begar] Lu s11ow up. As Ihc 
exchangc ralc apprecia tcd Lrarie halancc wnrsened and t h e  I'car or dcvalua tion 
induced capital f'ljgh t. 'The Ceritral Bank had Lo pump in roreign exchangc Fu 
stabilize the exchange rale leading tu reserve losses. Further, interest rate had 
to be kept high Lo prevent I'urLhcr capital flight which in turn  led Lo heavy 
servicing burden La I l~o  statc exchequer to bear. Ttic irltercst burden on loans 
reached a high of around 8 per cenl of GDP in 1988. 
Table BI 
m c  iadiators nf h i m  emmy dorinq the crisis pears 
(mss Iwstic 
W [at 
mbtprices] 8.3 8.8 -0.6 -4.2 3.6 2.5 -3,T 1.5 1.1 
Wp Pebt 
[as percent 
of tDP) 21,1 33,s 54,4 66,s 55,4 53.0 74,3 '15.6 77,O 
...a .*-.4 ..,. -.-QQ..YYY..YY-~, * Y  ---- ~ ~ ~ ~ * ~ - - ~ - ~ - - . ~ ~ . . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . . = " ~ ~ ~ a ~ - " . e ~ ~ ~  
Source : Same as L i ~ l l  l C: I . 
Under tl~csc clrcurnsla~~ccs tradc libcra1i;t;lllon has c o m e  to Mcxi~vl i r ~  a big 
way, The authorities thought that trade liberalization could act as a powerful 
Instrument to curtail inflation as cxternal prices might act as ceiling to domestic 
priws. 
The Impact d Ncw Emnumic I'o/icy 
As mentioned earlier, t h e  macro economic adjustment was  followed by wide  
ranging pollcy reforms which inter alia included fiscal reforms, privatization of 
state owned enterprises and negotiation of external debt, monetary reforms and 
trade liberalization. We may summerise belaw t h e  rnqjor changes that occurred 
h the Mexican economy since 1988. By 1990, Mexico presented itself an entirely 
different scenario from what it looked during t he  previous decade. The state 
autonomy in economic decision making and the largesee of expenditure-making 
which dominated the pu b1ic expenditure led growth phase, almost disappeared by 
1990. The central government kept its expenditure at a basic minimum level. 
Consequently, therefore, for t he  first t ime,  fiscal balance improved considerably 
and In 1989 (for the first time) the fiscal sciene registered a surplus (see Table 
IV). 
Table IV 
Trends in Government Dcf icit ( A s  a percentage of GDP)  
--3----d_____----+_---------------------------d----------- 
Year Econami c Operational Primary 
D e f i c i t  Deficit (X) Deficit ( + )  
--------_-_----+_----------------------------------------- 
1984 7.1 - 2.9 -5.5 
1985 8.0  3 . 3  - 3 . 9  
1986 14.9  7.0 -2.2 
1987 1 3 . 4  5 . 4  -6.9 
1988 10.7 0.7 - 6 . 4  
1989 5.7 - 2 . 6  - 8 . 3  
------_-----------_--------------------------------------- 
3wrce:Andrien Tenkate, Trade  Liberalisation in Mexico, Lessons of 
Experience, World Development, Volume 2 0 ,  1992. 
X -Excluding inflation component of interest  payments on domestic 
public debt. 
+ -Excluding a l l  i n t e r e s t  payment. 
In order to achieve this, programmable spr:riding Elad C o  be reduced to 
around 9 per cent per ycar. 'I'ogcttlur, w i t h  r cduc t i o r~  i t 1  spending,  the 1t:vt:l of 
snbsidics and transrr:rs was also reduced .  l ' h e  eliminatjon or price differentials 
for energy and basic pelroct~emical producls  and Ihe reduction of financial 
transfers to  development banking were among Lhe most imporEarit sleps in this 
dlsection. 
. Along with these developmerits privatization proceeded with  great vigour. 
More than 80 per cent of' ttm 1115 statc-run companies which had existed in 1982 
were nolonger Lhcrc by  1!)(31. 'I'tlc I'unrls ralscd Tram dlvcslmorll or publlc scctor 
shares have been used to reduce Che volume of internal debt.  This measure led 
to a seduction of internal debt  from G per cent to 2 per cent of GDP in 1991. 
The re-negotiation of foreign debt  with commercial banks, Paris Club, IMF and 
World Bank allowed Mexico to have a long Cerm resettlement implying lighter 
servicing incidence. Foreign deb t  servicing (as a percentage of GDP) which had 
stood at 12.1 per cent of CDP came down to 5.2 per cent by 1991. 
Trade liberalization which had began i n  t h e  mid -sixties accelerated. Items 
mered by import licensing relative t o  tradeable output which had been 100 per 
@ent in 1983 had declined to 9.1 per cent in 1991. The average tariff which 
3tmd at 27 percent in 1983 was brought down sharply to 13.1 per cent in 1991 
(see Table V). 
Table Y 
Indicators of Trade Liberalization 
Years Average Tariff Impor t  Permit Coverage 
Source: AndrLcn Tcnka t c  op. ci L . 
The social impact or structural adjustment polides may be assessed now. 
Mexico Is the typical example or a country where reforms in the realm of finance, 
Inmme and expenditure policies have pushed the  econen~y to n poirit or self- 
defeat in respect to social justice. Thc  dislributinn oS weallh and income during 
the adjustment phase hcllnved in a regrcssivc fashion. To illustratcl, the Mexican 
wage Income declined an an ;~veragF 8,l per cerlk pcr annum (see Tablc VI and 
VII]. A sharp decline oP 21.6 per cent in 1883 and 10.7 per ccnt in 1984 
eccurred during the  t w o  years of lhe deepest economic crisis. The population 
living in poverty though r e g i s b e d  a decline betweer1 1970 and 1981 From 34 to 
29 per cent, however, increased t o  51 ~er'cent by 1986". By the end of 80s 
according to Hernandez Laos poverty in Mexico had reached a figure of 59 per 
It cent . In the words or Manvel Pastes, "The high ratc of inflaLlan, dedinc in real 
wages and capital flight created a perverse distributional dynamics - the poor 
uadetgoes austerity in order to pay for international banks which in tu rn  make 
interest payments t o  those LalAn Americans wealthy enough to have assets 
abroadW. 
In thk conkxt, a glarlce I n t r ~  i~ f c w  more ramifications is In nrdcr. The 
agricultural labour hous~halds  In pas LIcular regis Lered sapid decline in 
eansurnption. The performance of agricultural output and prices, the  reduction 
in agricultural credit and subsidies and an attempt to hold down prices during 
the solidarity pack dep;:s:;:d Carnl wagcs and pushed thc farm households down 
to poverty levels. On the contrary, the non-wage share oP the total income rose 
from 61.0 per cent In 1981 ta 71.6 per cent in 198814. To illustrate Further, by 
1980s the income distribution was worsening further,  with the share of income 
to the lowest 40 per cent oi" the household declining from 14.3 per cent in 1984 
to 12.9 pcr c e n t  I n  11)8!1 i lnc l  the shnr-c Inmrnc or hlghcsl; ken pc!r curl t !lf thc  
household Increasing Cram 33.8 per mrlt i n  1984 to 37.95 in  1989. 
Table YI 
i~ Real Uages and Ilneaployrent: Mexico 
1980 1981 1982 1903 1984 1g85 1 5 8 6  1987 1988 
...... I.-------**-*---*-*---*---******--**--**--------* ---- ----*---*----"------------------------ 
1111 l l I n h  ragee 
(parlg grorth rates) -7.4 1.3 3 . 3  -25 .2  -8.3 -1.2 -10.0  - 4 . 1  -12 .7  
kil irerage wage8 
{parly growth rates) -0.8 4 . 2  - 2 . 4  - 2 6 , 5  -4.9 1.0 -9.9 5.5P n.a. 
bli altqloynent rate 4,6 4.2 4 . 2  6 . 6  5.7 4 . 4  4 . 3  3 , 9 p  3 . 5 ~  
It11 60P per capita 
I [yrlj jrowtb rates) 16.2 -0.7 -21.8 -0.3 0.7 -6.2 -6.4 n.a. 
hicw S a m ~  EI! table 1. 
);GY: p a p l t l i i n a ~ j c  na. = not available 
?able VIE 
M fP kg~, JIM-ww inme ad q l p t :  h i m ,  l9flO-1989 
---I.I*---*-------*--------*"-----**---*-*-*-*--"---------------**-----**------------------------h---*--**+*-+---"**+- 
(annual rates of change in per cent) Average Cumulative Average Average 
1980 1981 U82 1983 1984 1985 U86 1981 1980 19B9 1963-88 1983-88 1983-85 1986-17 
IhIlagehc~ae - 11.3-5.4 -24.6 -2.7 2 , O  -10.7 -2.0 -7.9 4.2 -0.1 
MI lape i~cm 
p -lace 
u t imlmts  - 5.8-5.3-23,l -5.0 -0.2 - 9 . 4 - 3 . 1  -8.4 2.7 -8.5 
hl Vages quoted 
blhdutrialsar~ey- 5,O 0,l-26,1 -6,8 1.1 -6.9 -1.4 -6.3 8.8 -7.8 
UWQ$ - 1,O 4.1 -21,9 -9,O -1.2 -10,5 -6.3 -13.4 -6.6 -10,b 
hitale msqtiw 
perpita - 4 . 6 - 4 . 9  -7.8 1.1 1.7 - 4 . 8 - 2 . 2  0.3 3.7 - 2 , O  
Iwr#]sincm . 4.8 2.0 -7.2 9.9 -0,2 -9.2 5:4 -3.4 9.0 -1.0 
bn of mqe 
irae in total 
b 61.460.0 61.8 66.6 69,2 68.8 69,1 70.6 71.6 72.7 69.3 
W M t  - 5.3 -0.3 -2.3 2.3 2.2 1 1 1  0.6 1.4 0.4 
w wlog-  
a (perwt) - 4.2 4,2 6,6 5.7 4.4 4.3 3,9 3,5 3.0 4.7 
Source: Same as table 1. 
As indicated earlier, government expenditure on social sectors reg is tered 
a sharp decline, Estimate indicated that outlays on education and health fell by 
a cumulative 30,2 per cent and 23.9 per cent respectively since 1982. To 
elaborate, the total spending on education which was around 20 per cent in 1979 
, d d n e d  to 10.6 per cent by 1985. The health expenditure which was 3.1 per 
cent In 1979 declined to 1.1 per cent by 1985. Several consequences of t h i s  
phenomenon like decline in t h e  school enrolment, increase 'of inraril and pre-  
school child mortality due to institutional deficiencies etc. have already been 
noted by scholars''. 
Table VIIX 
Share of Education and Wealth Spending In Total 
Spending of the Central Government in Mexico 
Head of Expenditure Years 
1970 1979 1985 
......................... 
Education 18.9 20.0 10.6 
Health 3.1 3.1 1.1 
------*------------------------------------- 
Source:Elina Cardoso and Ann Helwage, Below t h e  Line, Poverty, In 
Latin America, o p ,  ci t . 
The Tranm'tibn and after: 
The adjustment process came to a standstill by the end of the 1980's. By 
1990, policy makers used to claim that within the framework of stabilization and 
structural adjustment, considerable success had already been attained. The 
macroeconomic situation improved and inflation came down. However, paEicy 
makers were puzzled aver the phenomenon of Iow growth. When President 
winas took office in 1988 hc pledged lo generalc six pcrccrlt annual growth, 
Bet the growlh rate till 1991 averaged only 2.4 per cenl -only marginally l~lgher 
than the Mexican population growth rate, Since then, surprisingly enough, 
growth rate has come down further even to as low as 0.4 per cent by 1993, 
though inflation rate also remained low. ( S e e  Figure 1 ) .  The Mexican economy 
slnce the beginning or t h e  1990s did not show any semblance of further 
recovery. As a canscquencc of the limitcd gmwth oP the economy, open 
unempIoyment rose to 3,4 per cent in 1993, a figure greater than that for 1992 
(26 per cent). Though inflation remained subdued till 1994 due to drastic 
curlailmeat of government expenditure other two major anamales persisted: high 
lnterest rates and government intcrven tion in exchange rate stabusation. In 
order to prevent capital flight domestic interest rate had to be kept high and 
in order to seduce exchange rate uncertainty government intervention to maintain 
a stable exchange rate has become inevitable. Both ph~nomena, through their 
=era1 linkages, run through the capita1 account of t he  bahnce of payments. 
Interestingly enough, 'the strategy of exchange rate intcrventhn and high 
interest rate had to be resorted to during a period of import, liberalisation and 
in an overheated economy this lctl to a contraction in domcslic output and  an 
Incrcasetl dcmand Tor ImporLs. As Is w e l l  known, Moxitw lluv go~sc rlullc rrlr w l l l i  
Uberdization and the degree of its openess  has even surpassed thal of the 
United States. 
OIW or Ihc major consequences of th i s  phenomenon has becn that Lhe 
quantum of saving gol reduced. 'rheoretically, a temporary reversal or capital 
fbght should have raised internal saving but. the  lowering oT laril'f rates were 
accompanied by an import boom. Hence, consumpkion in the economy rose with 
prfvate inflation - adjusted saving failing from 19 per cent of GDP in 1989-90 to 
hs than 10 per cent of GDP in 1991-9316. 
Consequently, the external gap increased despite budgetary deficit 
remaining small (Figure I1 and 111). Strangely enough. the logical relation 
between current deficit and exlernal deficit no longer applied in the case of 
Mexim. Alternatively, the fcelirlg was gaining ground thal currenl account 
deficit relative to GDP stimulates strong expansion of private investment financed 
by capital repatriation or direct  foreign investment. No doubt, capital 
repatrjation and foreign investment began to rlow into Mcxico. But more 
Importantly, private investment did no t  get adequate stimulus since the 
eomplementarities between the public sector and private sector which had 
historically evolved in Mcxico gol suspended during stabilisalion. Therefore, 
wen after stabilisation, private capital remained shy. The demand surgcs were 
increasingly absorbed by imports arld finarlced by in- f lows  I n  ltio capilaE zlctwur~P. 
As Sidney Weintrab, has remarked, "'they felt it was okay to run  a current 
amunt deficit so long as foreign capital kept on coming in - that capital would 
finance production". A n  analysis oi' t h e  capital inflows showed that Mcxico 
rcceived $81 billion as capital Clows since the 1990s. BuL only 15 billion was In 
d im+ investment. In severaL other developing countries also we observe such 
fltuations. However, the  point of departure is that a very small fraction of 'the 
deficit is reflected in productive invcstmen t, t h e  rest accounting for short term 
spaulatlve investment of short term deposits, I t  needs  no emphasis that the  
build-up of foreign exchange with t h e  help of resource flows especially or the 
pwtfotio investment type on capital account, has the high risk of uncertainty and 
htablity. 
The two immediate reasons Tor t h e  collapse of Lhe bond market were the 
armed rebellion (rebels or chiapas) whose guerilla movemcnt in klre soutll of 
Mexico dramatized the plight of millions of poor Mexicans. Because of the revolt 
end the shock From massacre and arson which followed, Mexico un rlerwe~kt 
dramatic political upheavals which scared away short  ter rn investors. The holders 
of peso denominated Mexican Lreiisury bills switched on to dollar denomir~;~lcrl 
'Tesobonas' for hedging against a possible d~valuotion of "peso". The rise in 
American interest rate made investment in Mexico unattractive and prompted 
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Investors to take money out oF Mexico and Invest In risk S m e  America. The bond 
mket sent shock waves all over Mexico. By the end of December 1994, t h e  
prices of Mexican bond fell by 23 per cent. The Government decided to devalue 
the volatile 'peso' by 13 per cent. Frightened by the rush to  convert the peso 
denominated bonds lnto dollar denominated ones, the government decided to float 
the 'peso' which the government had secured from overseas credit, to defend the 
Womy. Besides, short-term interest had to be pushed up steeply to prevent 
further depreciation of t h e  peso. After devaluation. the Peso dropped from 3.5 
to a low of 5.6 to a dollar by mid January 1995, a decline oP close to 40 per cent. 
The peso goes on into a free fall. 
Once the dust settles, the solution articulated by the authorities in a 
package form would call For further sacrifies on the  part of the people of Plcxico 
for converting the devaluation into nn opportunity for export-led growth. 
IronlwDy enough, plans to revamp the economy consist of further sell-out to 
forelgn capikal and furlher cut  in govcrnrncnt spending. WiEh inflation going u p  
by45 per cent, workers would end up with a drastic wage cut as t he  new plan 
wages to rise only by less than halr the inflation ratio. For the last 
four years, wages have been squeezed to bring down infiation and today, they 
bg 10 per cent behind the 1980 level! 
Year 
- .  
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P K d s i n  GDP and lnflationl 
1980 1985 1840 
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The most intercstin g consequerlccs of the two crises elaborated above lie 
in Ule realm of the  structure of class f'orces of the Mexican society. The impor t- 
substitution stratcgy of Mexico w a s  .based on a populist type of class alliance 
anwng the State, domestic industrialists and foreign capital. In this type of 
mporatfsm, the state tends Lo b e  dominated by the military while the popular 
sectors are dernobilizeilfl. Howcvcr, in Ihe  case of Mexico, though the State is 
rtrongly authoritarian, it is noL rulcd by t h e  military. ~111' t he  beginning of 
1980s the aulhori tariarl regi rnc had tried to incorporalo with the ad minis tralion 
mtain elements of democracy and  polilical liberalism and responded to selective 
demands of various sectors of thc society. "Within the authoritarian system, the 
p&y and especially the popular organisatiuns, constituted the  principal means 
19 of communication between civil society and t h e  govcrnmcnt . The agrarian 
reforms, the na tionalisa tion of' large Coruig~l owncd oj 1 corn panics and the official 
support of labour organisations and or somc of tIleir demand allowed t h c  orricial 
party lo proclaim l t la l  i l  govcr-ncrl Mcxico i n  L l i c  rla~l~c of' p w p k  - workcrs, 
peasants and middle class". As the crisis overwhclmcd the regime, thc demand 
O? labour and the large majority of marginalised groups mainly the Indians, was 
met with repression and lerrorism. A s  the  structural adjustment gathered 
momentum, the intensity or repression increased. Moreover, t h e  trade agreement 4 
Mexico negotiated with t h e  U.S.A.  and Cariada furthcs sharpened the  conlradictioo 
between the ruling elitc and the  rnarginalised sections. A s  correctly illustraled 
by Craig Benjam with reference to the  agrarian scene. "The requirements for 
Mdco to eliminate subsidies for corn production, making it a11 bul  impossible for 
Mexican rarrners l o  r:onipctc: in the producliorl of Mcxico's mosL impor Lant diclary 
crop, According to a World Rank s t ~ ~ d y ,  between 1 . I .  and 1.9 million farmers wi l l  
be uprooted as a consequence of thcse changes. Jose Luis Ealver esLimated that 
these reforms w o ~ l d  lead to the dispossession oP some 10 million rural ~exicnns""' 
Ironically enough, due Lo the impact of economic measures in the lale 1980s, such 
as austerity programmes associated wi th  stabilization and structural adjustment, 
privatisatlon and wage cut which led to growing mabilisation of mar ginalised 
sections, all point to a new cofivergence of class forces in Mexico. The growing 
combat with the Mexican and the forcign capital on the one  side posited against 
the growing mobitisation of sul'rtsrillg inasscs on Ihc othcr can no longcr nl'rord 
the kind of "Tinc tun ing"  or t:nrqlicr decades, Mexico Loday is s i l l ing on a live 
and simmering volcano. 
In Lien of Conclusion 
To what extent does the Mexican expcrience have relevance in the context 
~ d w ~ l a ~ f n g  countrle~? TI. m a y  he pninl.c?d oi1L L h r r l ,  whnt  h o p p ~ n a d  In one 
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muntry with  its speciric socio-poli tical and economic environment does not 
provide a sure guide as to what would take place in other regimes and contexts. 
Evidently, Mexico Elas gone too far with the orthodox stabilization programme. 
ks seen earlier, the cost Mexico had to pay for undergoing the transformation 
has been enormous. The Mexican failure has to be understood in terms of 
rcgrcssivc: impilcl on irlr:omc dislribu tion whicll in Lhe Iorlg run proved sclf 
dereating. The logistics and the linkages of the Mexican imbroglio have already 
been discussedz2. Suffice it to conclude that a pseudo state of long run normalcy 
was rcad~crl wfltinu t much cnrlscquencc rjn protlucllvlly n r ~ d  grow l i t .  Morcovcr, 
In the process o l  adjusting the pu bllc &naceF a contractlonary process begon 
h the second phase ie. exlerrlaI deficit, and return to the  long run  normalcy of 
tbe budget, pushing the economy to increasing instability at enormous social cost. 
Now the policy makers in developing countries face a puzzle. From the Mexican 
experience they are rediscovering that opening up by deregulation, privatisation, 
and trade liberalisation in general is not a pre-condition to growth; rather it 
adds to the volatility of the economy. 
However, there are viewpoints expressed in India emphasisirlg t he  
dissimilarity between the Indian and Mexican economies. The rot lowing argument 
b often put forward to emphasise the point. 1ndja"s capital account being closed 
there is no question of capilal f l ight  here which played havoc in Mexican 
economy. Moreover, India does not represent a kind of semi-peripheral 
dependence syndrome that Mexico did. Here, the ruling class is much more 
dwferenthted and labour much more organized than in Mexico and therurore an 
adjustment strategy of depressing wages and income might not be possible in lhe 
Indlan context. On t h e  basis of relevant facts one could refute the above 
arguments, 
A s  for India, there may b e  a p  pnren t differences but t h e  fundamental forces 
0pW8thg here remain the same. As mentioned earlier in the Mexican context 
Import  lilberallsation was accompanied by a r tse in conspicuous consumption which 
in turn led to a drastic fall in t he  saving rate of t he  economy. Even the foreign 
h t m e n t  could not help Mexico to return to hlstarical saving rates to support 
growth during the post reform phase, Strangely enough, almost similar situation 
la slowly developing in India. The Domestic saving to GDP ratio declined sharply 
f r o m  23.7 per cent in 1990-91 to 20.2 per cent in 1993-94 and all indicators t o  a 
further fall in the years to tome. This is largely attributed to rise in 
mspecuaus consumljtfon ln the wake of liberallsatlon. The saving g a p  1s 
unlikely to be orrset by increase ia foreign investment for the Sollowfng rcasons. 
Of late, in India glaring diSScrence has been recorded belween the volume 
J dfmt foreign Envestmen t and that of portfolio investment; the ratio between 
Is 1:7 similar to U~a t  of Mexico in tlic iatc 6990s. Tile portfolio elerncnt in the 
bundle is likely lo swlri g baclc. This phenomcrion indlcnlcs t h e  Hmf l ta rmourw 
Ibw on capital account thaL a country like India could expect from foreign direct 
inmtment not withstanding its llberal and open door policy under economic 
.n 
Worms, Indh's hlgh tlcbt servlcc ratlo of 28 pcr ccnl is I~eadlnlf towards thc 
Hdm level of 46 per cent, by the t ime repayment starts such a high ratlo js 
h d  to curtail India's import generating capacity. Though Indla has a foreign 
cRchange reserve of US $ 22 billion agdnst Mexico's 8 billion, it was accumulated 
through lnrgc scale borrowing, which Is ltkely to get progressively dcplctcd when 
peak repayment slarls by 1994-05. 11) such a sltuution, illc un~ulrlat~lllcs 
regarding the future payments position may increase. Two similar situations or 
near collapse of financial system comparable to that of Mexico is not far away 
h m  our memory. The first w a s  in 1990 and second in 1992 when N R l s  withdrew 
thelr deposits abruptly. Ir the first was provoked by peUtical uncertainty and 
w o w i n g  balancing of payments position the second was, fol~owed by the 
security scam. 
In Mexico it was the expenditure cuts  and prlvatisation which were 
resorted to disastrous results particularly large scale unemployment and social 
misery. We also tend to follow the same logic indiscriminately. Already there is 
widence of increase in absolute poverty and unemployment in India, still we tend 
to brush aslde thc major qucsUons on social dImcns1ons or rcforms and 
raetrucburing. The distance between the miracle and tragedy in PlexSco was too 
short. As the economic forcxs in both countrfes tend to be the same we cannot 
assume away such a h tstoricul convergence in t h e  Indian mnlext. 
(1 am extremely grater ul to K. K,Suf?rd~rnanian and P.R. GopInCna than NoIr and 
Ogkarnath for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.) 
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